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Abstract. This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on 
international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental 
agreement making as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game 
with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, we propose our theory on non-
cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating 
proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of 
coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due 
to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is hardly any doubt that the management and protection of the natural 
environment occupies a central position in the agenda of most political parties 
and governments. It is particularly interesting, that unlike other issues, as for 
example trade, the environment cannot be treated as a unified domain under a 
common ‘umbrella agreement’, because of the large diversity of issues 
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involved, like climate change, resource exploitation, environmental product 
and process safety, pollution and emission standards, to mention a few. Partly 
due to this, the number of international environmental agreements in force 
today is several times larger than the number of international agreements on 
other important issues like migration or trade.1 It is beyond the scope if this 
article to review all possible issues regulated by international environmental 
agreements or to exhaustively classify the types of problems and solutions 
observed during the bargaining process.2 However, it is a common place that 
the issue-by-issue approach adopted worldwide allows each country to 
differentiate its role and bargaining attitude across different international 
organizations according to its interest in the issue under negotiation. Many 
have observed, for example, that ‘strong’ countries like the US often choose to 
play a secondary role in a specific negotiation process, because they do not 
intend to incur any of the costs entailed in the implementation of the agreed 
rules and, thus, do not participate as actively as they could with aggressive 
lobbying, a strong representative in the negotiation, etc. Another paradoxical 
observation is that although some agreements are not successful in inducing 
participation and compliance, they are not abandoned in favor of a better 
agreement. 
 
As Barrett and Stavins (2003) observe focusing on the Kyoto Protocol, 
problems are likely to arise regarding both the participation in and the 
compliance with international environmental agreements. However, that paper 
investigates alternative goals and policy instruments as a means of achieving 
compliance and participation. Barrett (2002, 2003) has also focused on the 
content of environmental agreements proposing a cooperative R&D approach 
to environmental innovation and standard-setting as a means of overcoming 
participation and compliance failures. However, the asymmetries entailed in 
most agreements seem to be largest obstacle against an environmental 
agreement’s ability to promote participation and compliance. In fact, as 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) note, the obvious solution of side-payments can 
be of limited help in promoting cooperation. For example, as noted by Barrett 
(2001) on the case of the Montreal Protocol, the treaty ended up as a 
1 In fact, according to the WTO, the number on Multilateral Environmental Agreements (over 
250) exceeds the number of Trade and Migration agreements taken together (approximately 
200, although migration is mostly regulated by bilateral, rather than multilateral agreements). 
See, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm.  
2 For an exhaustive review of types of agreements, see Churchill and Ulfstein (2000).  
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mechanism for monetary transfers from industrialized to developing countries, 
rather than as a means of reducing emissions. 
 
We have seen that most of the existing literature on participation in and 
compliance with environmental agreements has focused on the content of the 
agreements, whereas the negotiation process and the parties’ negotiating 
strategies have remained unexplored. We claim that some of the participation 
or compliance failures of multilateral environmental agreements may be 
precisely due to the parties’ positions and strategies during the negotiation 
process. Thus, in this paper, we deal with the bargaining process itself. We 
show how an alternating proposals protocol can modify the outcome with 
respect to the one-shot structure resulting from pre-established individual 
bargaining attitudes brought into a convention as binding commitments by the 
negotiating parties. Our framework can be used to explain why some 
agreements are achieved even if they yield no gains to all the parties involved 
and why some countries may choose to assume a soft bargaining attitude when 
the negotiation of new environmental standards is at stake. Furthermore, we 
explain why unsuccessful environmental agreements are not abandoned and 
the status quo prevails even in the presence of potential unilateral gains from a 
new agreement.    
 
For the sake of generality, we envisage the bargaining process leading to an 
international environmental agreement as a game whose outcome may be 
more or less favorable to one of the parties involved. In the extreme case, one 
of the parties may decide to adopt the softest attitude possible, minimizing its 
lobbying activities and other costs entailed in the bargaining process and let 
the others decide, incurring minimal compliance costs and benefits from the 
agreement. Of course, if all parties adopted the same passive attitude the status 
quo would prevail, but this would not be an equilibrium, because one of the 
passive negotiators would find it profitable to become active, promoting and 
eventually imposing its favorite type of agreement. But if all parties adopted a 
hard attitude, maximizing their lobbying activities they could end up in a 
situation which could be worse than both the status quo and than any 
asymmetric agreement. It must be clear by now that the situation resulting 
from this scenario resembles a Hawk-Dove game, with passive participants 
playing Dove and with aggressive ones playing Hawk. The one-shot version of 
the game would correspond to a situation in which the parties decide and 
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commit on their positions before they reach the negotiation table. This feature 
represents the fact that the agreement may become victim of unilateralism, or 
may simply become a “tote-board” for international cooperation, as noted by 
Levy (1993). But the high supervision costs of each country’s observance 
make unilateral compliance and participation desirable in the sense proposed 
by Schelling (1998). Equilibrium predictions are asymmetric, yielding a 
higher benefit to the tough negotiator than to the soft one. One variation to this 
situation can be represented by the sequential version of the game in which the 
first-mover party has an advantage and can implement its favored asymmetric 
equilibrium.  
 
We propose a novel approach, the Hawk-Dove game with confirmed 
proposals, which apart from the aforementioned asymmetric equilibrium 
points includes the symmetric situation of universal participation and 
compliance to the status quo. Some of the game-theoretic literature has dealt 
with bargaining as a non-cooperative game.3 Another strand has focused on 
‘rationally justifiable play’ in bargaining.4 In some of these articles, the 
interactions between cooperative and non-cooperative games emerge. 
However, traditional game theorists usually start their analysis by exogenously 
specifying that the strategic interaction among players belongs to the family of 
non-cooperative games or to the one of cooperative games. But in real life 
strategic interactions, as those leading to international environmental 
agreements, the nature of the game itself is an endogenous feature and it often 
happens that players start to act competitively, realizing only ex-post that they 
were playing a ‘cooperative game’, because the outcome they reach is always 
more collusive than what they imagined at the beginning. The ‘confirmed 
proposal’ mechanism introduced by Attanasi et al. (2011a, 2011b) is a non-
cooperative process leading to cooperative results. They call their bargaining 
protocol – that may be seen as an extension of Rubinstein’s (1982) model of 
bargaining over the split of a pie – ‘Game with Confirmed Proposals’ 
(henceforth GCP). Attanasi et al. (2011a) introduce this alternating proposals 
protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. They let the two players bargain over their strategies in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: the bargaining supergame ends when one of the two players 
confirms his/her proposal and the proposal of his/her opponent. At that point, 
3 See, among others, Nash (1950, 1953) and Sutton (1986). 
4 See Harsanyi (1962), Friedman (1971), Smale (1980) and Cubitt and Sugden (1994). 
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the original Prisoner’s Dilemma is finally played according to the proposed 
and confirmed strategy profile. Focusing on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, they 
show that when players alternate in exerting the power to end the game, the 
unique equilibrium confirmed agreement is the cooperative (Pareto-efficient) 
outcome. They test their theory in the lab: the experimental results provide 
strong support for the prediction of cooperation in social dilemma games with 
confirmed proposals. Attanasi et al. (2011b) apply a modified version of the 
confirmed proposals protocol with alternating power of confirmation to a 
variety of one-shot and two-stage original games, including the battle of sexes, 
a trust game, a game of entry and ultimatum bargaining. In their modified 
confirmed proposals protocol, bargaining periods are overlapping: in each 
bargaining period, the counterproposal of the second mover represents at the 
same time the proposal of the first mover in the subsequent bargaining period. 
Moreover, each time a player re-proposes the same strategy after the 
opponent’s counterproposal, the game ends with a confirmed agreement, given 
that a ‘re-proposal’ leads to ‘confirmation’. This additional rule works as a 
‘chain’ between subsequent proposals of one player. That is why they call 
such mechanisms ‘Games with chained Confirmed Proposals’ (henceforth 
GcCP). Their results confirm the intuition that the confirmed proposals 
protocol is especially efficient as coordination-facilitating, inequality-reducing 
and cooperation-enhancing device. 
 
In this paper, we apply both bargaining mechanisms (GCP and GcCP) to an 
environmental international standards game where two countries have to 
decide whether to stick to a previously agreed status quo environmental 
agreement or to unilaterally adopt a new standard in their own environmental 
practices. If both countries decide to break the status quo, then they engage 
into a new negotiation leading to a new agreement over environmental 
standards. First, we frame this ‘original’ game as a Hawk-Dove game. If the 
original game is played simultaneously or as a two-stage game with 
observable actions, in equilibrium one of the two countries breaks the status 
quo agreement by imposing its new preferred environmental standard. 
Conversely, we show that if the two countries bargain over the strategy profile 
to play in the original Hawk-Dove game, cooperation in maintaining the status 
quo agreement may emerge in equilibrium. Indeed, if the adopted bargaining 
mechanism is a GCP with alternating power of confirmation, the two 
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asymmetric equilibria of the Hawk-Dove game are still possible equilibria of 
the GCP. However, also cooperation in maintaining the status quo can be 
reached as equilibrium of the bargaining supergame. Furthermore, if specific 
restrictions over the set of possible proposals are added inside the bargaining 
protocol (GcCP), cooperation in preserving the previously agreed 
environmental standard emerges as the unique equilibrium outcome. 
  
The paper may be seen as a follow-up of both Attanasi et al. (2011a) and 
Attanasi et al. (2011b) in two directions. First of all, we apply the two 
confirmed proposals mechanisms, respectively GCP and GcCP, to an original 
game, the Hawk-Dove, which was not previously analyzed under these 
bargaining protocols. Further, we show the importance of the application of 
these new negotiation mechanisms to the field of environmental agreements 
formation and maintenance. In this regard, the aim of this paper is to highlight 
how the complexity of the strategic interactions behind an agreement over 
international environmental standards requires the adoption of more 
sophisticated bargaining protocols that merges strategic non-cooperative 
features with those cooperative incentives evolving from repeated negotiation.  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we 
represent the strategic interaction over setting the environmental international 
standards as a Hawk-Dove game. Section 3 describes the theoretical 
framework for the study of bargaining as a solution of a Hawk-Dove game. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
1. The Environmental Agreement Game 
 
1.1 A Hawk-Dove Game 
As discussed above, the negotiations for environmental international standards 
and objectives among a number of countries can be modeled as a Hawk-Dove 
game. Following the original intuition behind this game,5 let us define as 
 the value of a given environmental agreement for country i when 
countries negotiate over adopting or not a new environmental standard. 
Assume that only two countries (1 and 2) are involved in the negotiation. In 
the status quo agreement – reached through previous negotiations – countries 
5 The earliest presentation of a form of the Hawk-Dove game is due to Smith and Price (1973). 
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1 and 2 get, respectively,  and  (with  possibly different for each i), 
where the superscript s indicates the status quo. 
Suppose that a more efficient environmental standard is now available to both 
countries. The adoption of the new environmental standard by country i 
involves a technological cost for i that cannot be shared with the other country 
-i. However, if only country i sets the new standard, this cost is more than 
counterbalanced by the comparative advantage over the old standard. If an 
agreement is reached over country i unilaterally adopting the new standard, the 
new distribution of total value is  and , , where 
superscript h (l) indicates the higher (lower) value obtained under the new 
agreement by the country adopting (not adopting) the new technological 
standard. If instead both countries decide to break the status quo agreement by 
adopting the new standard in environmental practices, the comparative 
advantage vanishes. In particular, if a new agreement is reached over both 
countries adopting the new standard, each country will be worse-off with 
respect to any unilateral standard-setting agreement, i.e.  for  
(with  possibly different for each i), where superscript m indicates the 
minimum payoff a country can get in the environmental standard setting game. 
This is a key assumption characterizing a Hawk-Dove strategic situation: if 
both countries choose to engage in environmental innovation, the individual 
cost of ‘fighting’ will be greater than the increase in the individual value the 
(new) agreement may eventually lead with respect to the status quo. 
  
1.2 Simultaneous game 
Suppose that each of the two countries sets its own environmental standard 
without knowing the choice of the opponent. The one-shot structure of the 
Hawk-Dove game may also exemplify the participation in an international 
environmental convention by the two countries’ representatives, having pre-
established and binding commitments with their own countries. 
This situation is represented in Figure 1 as a simultaneous 2x2 game. The 
action ‘Hawk’ indicates the country’s decision to adopt the new environmental 
standard and the action ‘Dove’ indicates its choice to avoid competition by 
leaving the other country free to set the new standard (if the opponent chooses 
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‘Hawk’) or leave things as they are in the status quo, without any new 
environmental agreement (if the opponent chooses ‘Dove’ too). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Payoff matrix of the Hawk-Dove game. 
 
From Figure 1 it can be easily seen that each country does not have any 
incentive to fight if it expects the other to be aggressive in the negotiation 
(notice that the payoff outcome linked to the strategy profile (Hawk, Hawk) is 
Pareto-dominated by any of the other three outcomes of the game). Further, if 
one country expects the other not to implement the new standard, the former 
has a clear incentive to do it, due to the comparative advantage in this case. 
Thus, the Hawk-Dove game in Figure 1 has two Nash equilibria in pure 
strategies (and one in mixed strategies). In both of these pure strategy 
equilibria, (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk), each country picks one of the two 
possible strategies, and the other country simultaneously chooses the opposite 
strategy. 
Therefore, the equilibrium analysis of this strategic situation clearly leads to 
an anti-coordination result: there exists no pure strategy equilibrium where the 
two countries maintain the environmental standard on which they previously 
agreed. 
 
1.3 Two-stage game 
Now suppose that the interactive strategic situation is dynamic either because 
one of the parties has an advantage in the timing of commitments, or simply 
because it has a history as a credible leader in the negotiation. Thus, one 
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country sets its environmental standard first. The other can observe the 
opponent’s choice before deciding its own environmental standard setting 
strategy. In the dynamic Hawk-Dove game represented in Figure 2, one of the 
two countries (i, with ) decides first and the other (-i) observes the first-
mover’s ‘proposal’ before choosing its own.         
 
 
Figure 2. Two-stage Hawk-Dove game. 
 
In the two-stage dynamic version of the game, the player moving first has an 
advantage. Indeed, the choice of the first-mover is actually equivalent to a 
commitment: the second-mover best-replies by choosing the opposite action, 
i.e. Hawk if Dove, and Dove if Hawk (bold arrows). Therefore, in the unique 
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, the first mover decides to 
set the new environmental standard and the second mover keeps the old one. 
Thus, the country deciding first increases the payoff with respect to the status 
quo, while the opponent accepts a lower payoff. Therefore, the first mover 
imposes its preferred agreement (first-mover advantage). 
 
 
2. Choice of the environmental strategy through confirmed proposals 
 
2.1       Bargaining over strategies in the Hawk-Dove Game 
Notice that in both situations analyzed the previous section, in equilibrium 
there is no collaboration in setting the environmental international standard. 
Independent of the fact that the negotiation is simultaneous (Figure 1) or 
dynamic (Figure 2), the de facto standard after the negotiation will be 
‘imposed’ by only one of the two parties. But imagine now that the two 
countries have no pre-established simultaneous or sequential commitments 
i  
 
H 
-i 
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 D 
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and can interactively alternate proposals on their standard-setting strategies. 
This is equivalent to a situation in which the parties arrive at the negotiation 
table with flexible attitudes and are prepared to announce their strategies 
before confirming them in an irreversible manner. We assume that such 
announcements are like cheap talk with the only difference that they can be 
turned into actual strategies in a confirmation stage, after all players’ 
announcements have become public knowledge. If a standard-setting strategy 
profile is confirmed in the bargaining supergame, then the countries have a 
binding agreement over how to play the Hawk-Dove environmental game. 
 
2.2 Infinite game with confirmed proposals 
Suppose now that the two countries bargain over the strategies to play in the 
environmental international standards Hawk-Dove game shown in Figure 1 
according to a confirmed proposals mechanism. Figure 1 above – besides 
presenting the one-shot original game – at the same time shows all the 
possible outcomes of the bargaining (super-) game with confirmed proposals 
built on it. 
A GCP is as interactive strategic situations in which at least one player, in 
order to give official acceptance of a contract, must confirm his/her proposal 
in combination to the proposal of his/her opponent. Given the set of possible 
strategies Si = {H, D} for country i =1,2 in the Hawk-Dove game in Figure 1, 
the GCP represents the way according to which the two countries bargain 
about strategies in Si.  
In each bargaining period t, players are randomly assigned one over two roles: 
proposer or responder. Each bargaining period t is constituted by three stages, 
namely (t.I), (t.II), and (t.III). In stage (t.I) the proposer picks a strategy in Si 
(proposal); at stage (t.II), the responder, after having seen the strategy picked 
by the proposer, picks a strategy in Si (counterproposal);6 finally, at stage 
(t.III) the proposer decides whether to confirm or not the strategy profile 
picked by the two players. The proposer is actually the only player having the 
power to confirm the proposed strategy profile in a period. The game ends if 
and only if the proposer at the end of a bargaining period confirms the 
proposal–counterproposal sequence in that period. In this case, the confirmed 
6 Recall that in the original Hawk-Dove game the two players have the same set of strategies. 
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action profile leads to a confirmed strategy profile that is successively played 
in the Hawk-Dove game. If the proposer in a period does not confirm the 
strategy profile proposed in that period, another bargaining period with the 
same rules starts. Therefore the GCP through which the two players bargain 
over the strategy profile to be played in the Hawk-Dove game has a potentially 
infinite sequence of bargaining periods, i.e. t = 1,2, …,+∞. The proposer in the 
next bargaining period can be the same of the previous period or not. In this 
paper we focus on a GCP with alternating power of confirmation: once a 
player is randomly selected to be the proposer in period 1, he/she will play as 
proposer in period 1 and in each odd period; the opponent will play as 
proposer in each even period. Hence, players alternate in exerting the power to 
end the game (by confirming the agreement reached in a period). Without loss 
of generality, suppose that the player randomly selected to be the proposer in 
period 1 is player i in the Hawk-Dove game, with i = 1,2. 
The GCP version of the Hawk-Dove game is represented in Figure 3. The 
payoff set of this supergame is the same as the original game in Figure 1, with 
the first of the two payoffs referring to the proposer in bargaining period 1 and 
the second referring to the responder in bargaining period 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals. 
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As in Attanasi et al. (2011a), we assume that each player’s preference relation 
among the possible agreements of the GCP satisfies the three conditions: 
patience (the bargaining period where the contract is signed is irrelevant); 
stationarity (the preference between two outcomes does not depend on the 
bargaining period); the payoff each player receives if no contract is signed is 
not better than the minimum payoff of the game (in the Hawk-Dove situation 
in Figure 1, this payoff is  for each player ). 
Proposition 1 shows that in the GCP version of the Hawk-Dove game, if the 
power of confirmation is symmetric, all strategy profiles of the original game 
apart from the one in which both countries break the status quo environmental 
agreement can be confirmed in equilibrium. 
Proposition 1. The set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in the Hawk-
Dove game with confirmed proposals and asymmetric power of confirmation 
is . Each of these three outcomes can be confirmed in 
any bargaining period t = 1,2, …,+∞. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the game in Figure 3. First of all, notice that 
players cannot agree in equilibrium on the strategy profile (H,H), giving the 
proposer a payoff of . In each bargaining period t, the proposer in that 
period will never confirm this contract, given that it can always commit to 
play the strategy (D,Yes), allowing a payoff of at least  in period t. 
Therefore, contract (H,H) is not an equilibrium outcome. Conversely, all other 
strategy profiles of the original Hawk-Dove game can be equilibrium 
outcomes. This can be verified by using a stationarity argument. Given that the 
game horizon is infinite, all subgames starting in odd nodes are identical and 
the same holds for all subgames starting in even nodes. Since players are 
rational, strategy profiles confirmed in period t will be the same as the ones 
that would have been confirmed at t+2, with t = 1,2, …,+∞. Hence we can 
characterize a subgame perfect equilibrium based solely on stationary 
strategies. Suppose that (D,H,Yes) is an equilibrium outcome. In a stationary 
equilibrium, the payoff profile at the end of period t = 1 has to coincide with 
the payoff profile at the end of period t > 1, for each t = 1,2,…,+∞. Therefore, 
given that the game starting in stage (t.I) and the one starting in stage (t+1.I) 
are isomorphic (the set of strategies in the two games are the same and the 
original game is symmetric) for each t, we can assign to each non-terminal 
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node at the end of every bargaining period t the payoff profile . 
Therefore, also the payoff profile in the continuation game at the end of period 
t is  for all non-terminal histories. That would lead the first proposer, 
player i, to choose Yes at stage (t.III) in every nodes apart from (H,H), since 
the payoff profiles ,  and  are no-worse for i than 
. In particular, since the payoff it obtains in the terminal node 
(D,H,Yes) is the same as in the non-terminal node (D,H,No), it is indifferent 
between confirming the agreement on the strategy profile (D,H) and not 
confirming it. Going backwards, in any case the responder -i would best-reply 
with H whatever i’s first proposal, thereby always getting , the highest 
possible payoff for i. Hence, at the beginning of period 1, player i would be 
indifferent between H and D. Therefore, (D,H) can be an equilibrium 
agreement. Through the same stationary argument, we can show that also 
(D,D) and (H,D) can be equilibrium agreements. Let us first verify that the 
game may end in some period t with the plan of actions (D,D,Yes). Given that 
we assign to each non-terminal node at the end of bargaining period t the 
payoff profile , the proposer does not confirm (H,H) and (D,H), 
confirms (H,D) and does not decline (D,D), given that it gets the same payoff 
in the terminal node (D,D,Yes) and in the non-terminal node (D,D,No). Going 
backwards, the responder would best-reply to H with H and to D with H or D, 
hence leading the proposer to be indifferent between proposing H or D at the 
beginning of the period. Finally, let us verify that the game may end in some 
period t with the plan of actions (H,D,Yes). Given that we assign to each non-
terminal node at the end of bargaining period t the payoff profile , the 
proposer does not confirm at stage (t.III) any strategy profile in the original 
game apart from (H,D). In particular, (H,D) is not declined by the proposer 
because it gets the same payoff in the terminal node (H,D,Yes) and in the non-
terminal node (H,D,No). Going backwards, the responder would be indifferent 
between H and D whatever the first proposal (in every terminal and non-
terminal node at stage (t.III) it gets the same payoff, ), hence leading the 
proposer to be indifferent between proposing H or D at the beginning of the 
period. ■ 
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2.3 Infinite game with chained confirmed proposals 
Let us now suppose that the two countries bargain over the strategy profile to 
play in the original Hawk-Dove game through an alternative bargaining 
mechanism, where exogenous constraints are laid down over the set of 
possible paths of proposals. 
This alternative confirmed proposal mechanism entails a chain: if a strategy 
profile is not confirmed in a bargaining period, it becomes the starting point 
for the next negotiation period. This means that in each bargaining period the 
counterproposal of the second mover represents at the same time the proposal 
of the first mover in the subsequent bargaining period. Therefore, the 
bargaining periods are overlapping. Moreover, each time a player proposes the 
same strategy in periods t and t+2, the game ends with a confirmed agreement 
in period t+2, given that a ‘re-proposal’ leads to ‘confirmation’.  
To be more explicit, suppose that in period 1 player i proposes strategy H and 
that player –i  counter-proposes strategy H (which is conditional on strategy H 
for player i). If player i says Yes (that is, ‘I play H if you play H, taking into 
account that you play H if I play H’), then the game ends in the first 
bargaining period with the two players agreeing on playing (H,H) in the 
original Hawk-Dove game. If instead player i proposes D after the sequence 
H-H (that is, ‘I play D if you play H’), this is equivalent to No confirmation of 
the strategy profile (H,H), and so the negotiation continues. If player -i says 
Yes (that is, ‘I play H if you play D, taking into account that you play D if I 
play H’), then the game ends in the second bargaining period with the two 
players agreeing on playing (D,H) in the original Hawk-Dove game. If instead 
player -i proposes D after the sequence H-H-D (that is, ‘I play D if you play 
D’), this is equivalent to No confirmation of the strategy profile (D,H), and so 
the negotiation continues. And so on and so forth. 
The GcCP version of the Hawk-Dove game is represented in Figure 4. Again, 
the payoff set of this supergame is the same as the original game in Figure 1, 
with the first of the two payoffs referring to the proposer in bargaining period 
1 and the second referring to the responder in bargaining period 1.  
Notice that, due to overlapping bargaining periods, the bargaining period 1 
goes from period t = 1 till period t = 3, the bargaining period 2 goes from 
period 2 till period 4, and so on and so forth. Hence, period t = 2 indicates at 
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the same time stage (1.II) and stage (2.I); period t = 3 indicates at the same 
time stage (1.III), stage (2.II) and stage (3.I); period t = 4 indicates at the same 
time stage (2.III), stage (3.III) and stage (4.I); and so on and so forth.  
 
 
 
 
            Figure 4. Hawk-Dove game with chained confirmed proposals. 
 
 
Hence, with respect to the GCP analyzed in the previous section, such a 
mechanism entails an additional rule limiting the set of possible strategies a 
player may follow in the bargaining game. The reasons for the adoption of 
such ‘constrained’ mechanism may be many. For example, in an ex-ante stage 
of the bargaining game, players themselves may have agreed on this limitation 
in order to reduce the possibility of toughness challenges by some player. In 
the real world, the negotiating parties are usually not strangers and the value of 
eliciting the other’s “true” toughness may be of limited value. Besides that, 
such a mechanism is able to improve the meaning of the tacit communication 
behind a specific sequence of proposal-counterproposal-(no)confirmation. In 
fact, the strategy announced by a country in the pre-confirmation stages may 
have a signaling role on the country’s intention in this specific negotiation. 
Furthermore, limitations of the possible sequence of proposals-
counterproposals-(no)confirmation may be due to the wish of speeding up the 
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time needed to find a consensus over the strategy profile to play. Indeed, in a 
‘standard’ GCP, Attanasi et al. (2011a) show that players may be ‘tempted’ to 
lengthen the negotiation by sending confusing signals to their counterpart. 
In the GcCP version of the Hawk-Dove game, only the cooperative outcome 
can be confirmed in equilibrium, as formally stated in Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2. The Hawk-Dove game with chained confirmed proposals has a 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, , that can be confirmed 
in any bargaining period t = 1,2, …,+∞. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us consider the infinite game in Figure 4. Each tree 
branch belonging to the equilibrium path (bold arrows) is part of a weakly 
dominant strategy. More precisely, each player’s strategy leads to the 
following result: the payoff obtained by the player through confirming a 
strategy profile in period t, with t = 3,4,…,+∞, equals the highest payoff it can 
get by continuing the game. Observe that in Figure 2 (first 7 periods of the 
game) there are four decision nodes where one of the two players can confirm 
the strategy profile yielding its highest payoff possible. At period 4, after the 
non-terminal history (H,H,D), player -i can get 
 
by choosing H, hence 
confirming its most preferred strategy profile in the original game, (D,H). If, 
instead of confirming, player -i chooses to continue the game, in any subgame 
in the continuation game, it can get at most a payoff of , by confirming the 
same strategy profile it could already confirm at period 4. Therefore, for 
player -i confirming the strategy profile (D,H) at period 4 weakly dominates 
continuing the game. The same holds for player i at period 3, after history 
(H,D), and at period 5 after history (D,H,H,D); and for player -i at period 6 
after history (D,D,H,H,D). Therefore, each player’s equilibrium strategy in the 
GcCP prescribes confirming the favourable asymmetric outcome whenever 
possible. At the same time, in order to prevent the opponent from doing the 
same, each player’s equilibrium strategy in the GcCP prescribes confirming 
also the agreement (D,D) whenever possible. Therefore, at each period , 
each player proposes D in a stage every time where in the two previous stages 
the two players’ proposals were equal, and proposes H otherwise. This leads to 
the terminal history (D,D,D). ■ 
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game, 
player i starts by proposing strategy Dove to player -i, who counter-proposes 
 16 
strategy Dove. Then, player i confirms its strategy Dove, such that the original 
game strategy profile (D,D) is the (unique) confirmed agreement. This is 
reached already at the end of bargaining period 1 (i.e., at period 3), after the 
first interaction between the two players takes place. 
The comparison of Proposition 2 to Proposition 1 indicates that the possibility 
of a new agreement to emerge instead of the status quo critically depends on 
the parties’ ability to freely re-consider their preceding proposals in favour of 
a new proposal-counterproposal sequence. Lack of such flexibility reduces the 
ability of the confirmed proposals bargaining protocol to lead the process 
away from the status quo. As Barrett (2003) has already observed, the 
asymmetry of an agreement in favour of one or the other country may work 
against its adoption by the less favoured countries. However, here, we offer an 
alternative explanation and solution to compliance and participation problems, 
based on the argument that more flexible mechanisms in the absence of pre-
negotiation and pre-agreement commitments are more likely to lead to the 
acceptance of asymmetric agreements. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Environmental agreements are negotiated and eventually signed by 
asymmetric players. The countries involved may differ in size, technology and 
most importantly in development levels. Most of the literature on the 
difficulties faced within a multilateral environmental agreement focuses on the 
content of the agreement, which is expected to deal with the problem of 
asymmetries in order to solve compliance and participation problems. Thus, 
the bargaining process has remained an under-investigated domain. Part of this 
lack of connection between the bargaining and the environmental agreements 
literature is due to the fact that the former belongs mostly to the domain of 
cooperative games, while real-world environmental agreements are negotiated 
through non-cooperative processes. Thus, it has been a rather challenging task 
for bargaining theorists to deal with environmental agreements.  
In this paper, we have proposed the confirmed proposal version of a Hawk-
Dove game to illustrate how coordination problems and asymmetries may be 
overcome to explain the emergence of new asymmetric agreements or the 
survival of the status quo. We have also illustrated how the existence of 
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inflexibilities in the negotiation and re-negotiation process may hinder 
potentially beneficial departures from the status quo. Rather than mitigating 
the intrinsic and often inevitable asymmetries entailed in international 
environmental agreements, our framework implies that asymmetric outcomes 
are perfectly sustainable, as long as the (re)negotiation process allows players 
to use strategies which are not dictated by any type of negotiation 
commitments or pre-established negotiation positions, entailing the risk of 
coordination failures and, thus the emergence of the worst of all outcomes: 
costly unprofitable agreements.   
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